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ABSTRACT: Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society. The education 
system mirrors the broader societal divisions between Catholics and Protestants 
and the vast majority of students experience an education that remains almost 
wholly segregated based on religious identification. This paper places that 
segregation in a political context, by analyzing how the type of political system 
has impacted education reform as it relates to the development of an integrated 
education sector. Northern Ireland provides a unique opportunity to test the 
impact of political systems on education reform because, over the past ninety 
years, the state has been governed under majoritarian home rule, direct control by 
an external actor, and consociational home rule. Despite the deeply segmented 
education system, a group of parents began a concerted push for integrated 
education beginning in the 1970s. Over the course of three decades, their 
advocacy spurred substantial reform and served as the catalyst for an integrated 
education sector that now serves more than five percent of elementary and 
secondary students. The successes and failures of that movement provide strong 
empirical evidence that no matter the political system in place, civil society is 
critical to promoting integrated education reform in deeply divided societies.  
 
 
“Even if the last move did not succeed, the inner command says move again.” 





Northern Ireland’s education system has changed remarkably little over the past two hundred 
years. In the mid 19th century, the British government at Westminster approved the development of 
a national school system in Ireland intended to harmonize a disparate system of independent 
schools that received state funding and funneled most of it to Protestant children. Unfortunately, 
those reforms had little effect. The national schools quickly became fiefdoms of the respective 
Protestant and Catholic churches, children continued to attend schools run by their Church, and 
Protestant schools continued to receive preferential funding. While the funding is now equitable, 
that same separation remains. In contemporary Northern Ireland, 94 percent of students attend a 
school that is almost wholly Catholic or Protestant in its enrollment (DENI, 2012a).  
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Protestant children attend controlled schools run by the Department of Education in Northern 
Ireland (DENI) and Catholic children attend maintained schools run by the Catholic Church but 
funded by the state. This practice is so firmly entrenched that only five percent of children in 
controlled schools identify as Catholic and less than one percent of children in maintained schools 
identify as Protestant (DENI, 2012a). However, there is a third side to this story. The remaining six 
percent of children in Northern Ireland attend integrated schools where the status quo is far 
different. These schools aspire to reach at least 40 percent enrollment of each group; maintain a 
diverse faculty, administration, and governorship; and commit themselves to the ideals of 
integration (NICIE Statement of Principles, 2009). The development of this integrated sector is a 
fascinating story that spans the modern history of Northern Ireland and provides unique insight into 
the challenges of integration under successive political systems and the important role of civil 
society in that process. 
 
Literature Review & Hypothesis 
 
Education in Northern Ireland relies heavily on a system of segmental group autonomy that 
seeks to maintain stability through separation. Lijphart (1977) called this concept “negative peace” 
in the sense that it seeks to maintain stability without attempting to overcome the underlying cause 
of conflict. Andeweg (2003) puts it in more colloquial terms with the saying “good fences make 
good neighbors” (p. 528).  
 
The suitability of this theory’s application to deeply divided societies is contested by a 
substantial body of research that finds sustained intergroup contact capable of moderating 
intergroup hostility (see: Stringer et al., 2009). Meanwhile, less-than-optimal outcomes in 
segmental states as varied as Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Israel-Palestine have 
emboldened Lijphart’s detractors. Summarizing much of their position, Oberschall (2007) argued, 
“Recent history has repeatedly shown how ‘live and let live’ separatism rapidly descends into 
ethnic warfare in a crisis” (p. 237). 
 
Irish civil and political leaders going back almost two centuries have expressed sentiments 
similar to Oberschall’s and argued for greater integration between the historically segmented 
Catholic and Protestant communities, particularly in regards to education. Despite the frequency of 
such rhetoric, progress has been slow and halting. Nonetheless, an integrated sector has developed 
in spite of the obstacles.  
 
For the first fifteen years, efforts to establish integrated schools existed in a realm situated 
between the state and other basic building blocks of society − what Manor, Robinson & White 
(1999) defined as “civil society”. In the Northern Ireland context, it is best described as the realm 
between the Churches and the State. Since neither the Churches nor the State had an interest in 
surrendering control over to their respective sectors of the segmented school system, it fell to a 
coalition of parents to drive reform. The organization they formed – All Children Together (ACT) 
– was the primary driver for integrated education in the earliest stages and ACT formed the nucleus 
of the non-governmental, non-sectarian coalition that has pushed reform over the past forty years.  
 
This paper hypothesizes that civil society – represented in Northern Ireland by ACT and its 
allies – is necessary to the successful implementation of an integration agenda in deeply divided 
JGCEE, Vol. 2, No. 2, October 2012  •  144  
 
societies. For the period of time prior to the creation of ACT, this paper considers the null 
hypothesis that without a civil society committed to reform, an integrated agenda in deeply divided 




Northern Ireland’s political history can be divided into six phases of government (see Timeline 
1) employing one of three political systems: majoritarian rule, consociational power-sharing, or 
direct control by an external actor. This paper treats each of the first four phases (ending in 2002) 
as a separate case study that the hypothesis and null hypothesis can be tested against. This method 
of organization provides a manageable system for analyzing eight decades of Northern Ireland’s 
history while also accounting for the variations in political structure under which reform is being 
attempted. This paper draws on primary and secondary sources for data, including interviews 
conducted by the author, academic studies, official reports by the Department of Education in 
Northern Ireland (DENI), and detailed accounts of ACT, the Catholic Church, and other key 
players and periods in Northern Ireland’s history.  
 
Timeline 1: Political Systems 
1920-1972 Majoritarian Rule 
1973 Consociational Power-sharing 
1974-1998 British Direct Control 
1998-2002 Consociational Power-sharing 
2002-2007 British Direct Control 
2007 Consociational Power-sharing 
 
Failure at Stormont 1920-1972 
 
Northern Ireland came into being with the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which divided the 
island into two political entities. The 26 southern counties and their Catholic majority formed the 
Republic of Ireland and retained the Irish capital of Dublin. The six northern counties with their 
Protestant majority remained a semi-autonomous region within the United Kingdom and created a 
new seat of government in Belfast, with its Parliament at Stormont (McEwen, 1999). From 1920-
1972, Northern Ireland was ruled under a devolved system of majoritarian government that heavily 
favored the Protestant population. Structural inequalities in employment, housing, and justice 
would remain the status quo until a Catholic civil rights movement in the 1960s erupted into 
violence known as “The Troubles” in the 1970s. 
 
In deeply divided societies majoritarian systems pose a major challenge because the party in 
power has total control over the resources of the state and little vested interest in the rights of the 
minority. In Northern Ireland, this created strong vested interests on the part of both the majority 
and minority to maintain influence over their own education systems, which appears to have 
crowded out civil society. Prior to the formation of ACT in 1974, there was no dedicated non-
governmental, non-sectarian effort to break down the segmented educational system. Instead, that 
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segmented system only strengthened during the period of majoritarian rule, confirming the null 
hypothesis that without a civil society committed to reform, an integrated agenda in deeply divided 
societies will not progress. 
 
From 1920 to 1972, the Ulster Unionist party controlled between 62 and 76 percent of the seats 
at the Parliament of Stormont (Crighton & Iver, 1991). Since Stormont operated under a British 
system of majoritarianism during this time, the Unionists were able to “form one-party 
governments with no Catholic representation whatsoever” (p. 131). This heavy-handed 
majoritarianism had deleterious effects on the state institutions, which “appeared to express the 
interests of only one group in society and therefore lacked the autonomy so essential to political 
development” (p. 131). In laymen’s terms, this meant that the state significantly privileged 
Protestants to the detriment of legitimacy and, ultimately, stability. 
  
Protestant schools received more funding, Protestant communities received better services, and 
– even when controlling for lower levels of education – Protestant workers received better jobs in 
both the public and private sectors (Hancock, 1998). As Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2004) 
highlight, this type of clientelism – a process where goods and services are exchanged for political 
support – “tends to flourish in insecure political and economic environments […] and is integral to 
the politics of survival for both patrons and clients” (p. 165). It also further entrenched division 
because the majority, which had the power, had no incentive to change the arrangement on its own 
accord.  
 
Lord Londonderry, Northern Ireland’s first Minister for Education, harbored an idyllic vision 
of “schools where children of different faiths might study and play together” and “denominational 
religious instruction only [took place] outside hours of compulsory attendance" (Bardon, 2009, p. 
13). However, Londonderry’s views clashed with the political realities of a system underpinned by 
segmentation. He could not even find support from the commission that he convened to make 
suggestions for education reform. That body – the Lynn Commission - declared: 
 
Whilst we deplore the fact that children of all denominations have not been educated 
together, and believe that this separation of the pupils has been productive of great 
injury to the community, we think that under existing conditions no attempt to 
amalgamate schools under Roman Catholic and Protestant management would meet 
with any measure of success. (Lynn Report, 1922, p. 221) 
 
Londonderry ignored this advice and moved forward with an attempt to create inclusive schools. 
Although he had the initial support of his Ulster Unionist Government, he was handicapped by the 
absence of a civil society to support his reforms. This did not prove to be a challenge initially when 
his 1923 Education (Northern Ireland) Act, complete with language that restricted denominational 
instruction in state-managed schools, passed an unwitting Parliament. However, the bill quickly 
generated a firestorm of controversy with both the Protestant and Catholic churches “embittered by 
what they saw as the Act’s usurpation of their traditional role in education” (Irish Educational 
Documents, 1995, p. 34).  
 
Capitalizing on their influence in the majoritarian system, the Protestant clerics formed the 
United Education Committee of the Protestant Churches and quickly set about “directly threatening 
the new and fragile government” (McEwen, 1999, p. 8). Without any organized group (i.e., civil 
JGCEE, Vol. 2, No. 2, October 2012  •  146  
 
society) in a position to support Londonderry’s reforms and counteract pressure from the Churches, 
the 1923 Act was short-lived. Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Craig withdrew his support 
for Londonderry’s reforms, an amending bill was rushed through Parliament that rolled back his 
reforms, and Lord Londonderry resigned the following year (Akenson, 1973).  
 
Timeline 2: Major Acts, Events, and Orders 
1920 Government of Ireland Act 
1923 Education (Northern Ireland) Act 
1930 Education Act 
1973 Sunningdale Agreement 
1974 ACT 
1978 Dunleath Act 
1981 Lagan College founded 
1989 Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 
1998 Good Friday Agreement 
 
The lack of a civil society capable of mitigating the influence of the Protestant Churches 
certainly hastened the failure of the 1923 Act, but that narrative only tells half the story. It is also 
important to understand that the Catholic Church had little intention of ceding influence over its 
schools and would sustain great injuries to maintain its control. 
 
After Londonderry’s departure, subsequent legislation only further separated Catholic and 
Protestant school children, with the 1930 Education Act “putting denominational schooling on a 
statutory footing” for the first time (McEwen, 1999, p. 9). The Act established tiers of schools, with 
the most funding going to those that acquiesced to full state control. Protestant churches were 
willing to cede control to the Protestant state, but that option was unacceptable to the Catholic 
community whose schools represented “the only major state system in their control in an otherwise 
hostile cultural and political environment” (McEwen, 1999, p. 10). As a result, the Catholic Church 
maintained control over its own schools and accepted the lower levels of funding. This was only 
the most egregious example of “the unionist government with its unassailable majority 
discriminating against Catholics in education provision” (Bardon, 2009, p. 15). However, the 
willingness of the Catholic Church to accept this discriminatory arrangement shows the barriers 
that would face the government if, acting alone, it sought to reduce the influence of the Catholic 
Church. In fact, in later years as the advent of a civil society dedicated to integration led to the 
creation of integrated schools it would be the Catholic Church and not the Protestants that would 
provide the fiercest opposition.  
 
Sunset on Sunningdale 1973 
 
In 1972 the Catholic civil rights movement that had been gaining traction over the course of 
the 1960s erupted into violence so severe it led the British Government to exercise its authority to 
suspend the Parliament of Northern Ireland and reintroduce direct control. However, negotiations 
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to reinstitute a power-sharing government began immediately and resulted in the 1973 Sunningdale 
Agreement. The Agreement created a new legislative body called the Northern Ireland Assembly 
that would be elected by proportional representation and then select an executive through the 
D’Hondt method.1 The power-sharing executive began its work at the end of 1973, only to be 
struck a critical blow two months later when anti-Sunningdale leaders were elected to all but one of 
the Protestant districts in a Westminster general election. As a result, the opinion of Basil McIvor, 
the recently installed Minister of Education, was that “the time available for implementing 
educational change was likely to be exceedingly short” (Bardon, 2009, p. 23). The specter of an 
impending collapse of the Government significantly complicates interpretation of the Sunningdale 
government’s actions during the five months before the Agreement failed on May 28, 1974. Since 
there was still no active civil society, this section tests for the null hypothesis in the context of 
consociational power-sharing. 
 
In April of 1974, just a month before the government failed, Basil McIvor proposed to 
introduce a new category of “Shared Schools” that would be open to children of any religion. 
Despite its voluntary nature, the plan was incredibly audacious for a government whose political 
fortunes were in question. Nonetheless, McIvor had the unanimous support of the Northern Ireland 
Executive, the strong support of the Methodist Church and the Church of England, the cautious 
support of the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian Church, and the endorsements of the two 
principal teaching unions. Meanwhile, although the Catholic Church stated its opposition to the 
plan, a majority of SDLP members (the core Catholic party) indicated their willingness to explore 
the option (Bardon, 2009).  
 
At its surface, this seems to indicate a surprising willingness to break down the segmented 
education system and – if this effort were successful – would refute the null hypothesis since ACT, 
our marker for civil society, was not formed until a year later. Unfortunately, the government 
collapsed before the rhetorical support for the Shared Schools Initiative could be put to the test, 
precluding a conclusive decision on the null hypothesis in this case study. However, there are 
several reasons why the evidence suggests that, despite the excitement this bill precipitated, the 
Shared Schools Plan would not have been implemented.  
 
First, following the Westminster General Election, the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
Executive knew its time was limited, which reduced the potential cost of taking controversial 
stands. Second, the Churches had a history of publicly supporting integration but then failing to 
match their rhetoric with action. This would be seen four years later when, inspired by the 
ecclesiastical support for the Shared Schools Plan, a law was passed to allow the Churches to 
voluntarily convert their schools to integrated status and none did so. There is no reason to believe 
the circumstances were drastically different in 1978. Third, Assembly members were opportunistic 
in using debate on the Shared Schools Plan to make partisan attacks, which strained relations and 
likely would have fractured the already uneasy alliance if the government had not fallen shortly 
thereafter (Bardon, 2009). As would be seen three decades later when consociational power sharing 
was reinstituted, it does not take long for issues to become divisive in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.  
                                                             
1 The D’Hondt method is a mechanism for selecting a power-sharing executive. It functions as a form of 
draft, with each party allotted a number of minister appointments proportional to their representation in the 
Assembly. For more information see O’Leary, B., Grofman, B., & Elklit, J. (2005).  
JGCEE, Vol. 2, No. 2, October 2012  •  148  
 
 
Ultimately, protests collapsed the Sunningdale government before the fate of the Shared 
Schools Plan could be divined, so the null hypothesis is inconclusive in this case. However, the 
evidence suggests that the null is valid and the effort to provide integrated schooling options would 
have failed even if the Sunningdale government had not. Luckily, the Shared Schools Plan inspired 
a wide cross-section of society, which joined the nascent ACT when it formed shortly thereafter 
and began agitating for change. The founding of ACT created the first civil society organization 
created to promote educational integration and its efforts would ultimately play a critical role. 
 
The Era of Direct Control 1974-1998 
 
In 1974, facing widespread civil disorder, the British Government sitting in Westminster had 
little choice but to dissolve the Sunningdale Agreement and reinstitute direct control as an external 
actor.2 Rose (2001) points out that, prior to the beginnings of the Catholic Rights Movement, 
Northern Ireland was “given a low priority by the Labour Party in part […] due to the absence of 
political unrest or violence” (p. 11). Since the presence of unrest then prompted intervention, the 
presumption is that Westminster’s primary concern was ensuring peace and stability. As a result, 
one would expect reluctance to take any action that could aggravate the situation. Palmer’s (2005) 
hypothesis was that external actors had the latitude to make unpopular decisions because they were 
not accountable to domestic interests. Although Palmer acknowledged the potential for concern 
about stability, he still argued that Westminster played a critical role in reform by virtue of its 
qualities as an external actor. This section conditions his hypothesis by highlighting that 
Westminster was a reluctant reformer pushed to action by civil society. With ACT now constituted 
and actively lobbying for reform, it is possible to test the hypothesis that civil society is necessary 
to the successful implementation of an integration agenda in deeply divided societies. To do that, 
this section argues that without civil society Westminster’s concerns about stability would have 
trumped its capacity to act and stymied reform.  
 
Immediately following the introduction of direct control, British Home Secretary Callaghan 
took a strong position against educational segmentation. In his speech to the Labour Party 
Conference, he said it was “offensive that separate education is advanced as an unshakeable 
principle” (McGrath, 2000, p. 182). That speech set off rampant speculation about the approach 
Westminster would take to education reform. However, those hopeful for change had their hopes 
dashed by the Minister of State for Northern Ireland’s Education Portfolio, who told DENI that he 
was not mandated to change the laws surrounding segmentation and therefore would not take 
assertive action. From this early point it became clear the British leadership was not interested in 
pushing for transformational change out of fear such actions could incite backlash (Bardon, 2009).  
 
ACT responded by putting pressure on the British Government to take action. During this time, 
the organization commissioned public opinion polls that showed widespread support for integration, 
encouraged the Churches to make public declarations of support for such options, and frequently 
referenced documents – including the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the second Vatican Council’s Declaration on 
                                                             
2 Westminster is not a perfect external actor, but for the purposes of this analysis the categorization holds 
because (1) only 18 of the 650 Members of Parliament at Westminster are elected from districts in Northern 
Ireland, and (2) because Westminster assumed direct control after fifty years of devolved autonomy. 
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Christian Education – to argue that the British government and the Catholic Church had a legal 
obligation to support reform (McGrath, 2000).  
 
When those efforts failed to prompt action from Westminster, ACT recruited Lord Dunleath of 
Ballywalter – a Northern Irish Peer – to its cause. Lord Dunleath agreed to introduce a private 
members bill that would create a process through which the Boards of Governors of Protestant 
controlled and Catholic maintained schools could voluntarily elect to transform into a new category 
of controlled integrated schools. Despite last minute attempts from within the British government 
to discourage Lord Dunleath from taking action, once his bill was introduced, it passed both houses 
and was amended into the Education (Northern Ireland) Act of 1978, colloquially known as “the 
Dunleath Act.”  
 
Dorinda Lady Dunleath recounted this masterful strategy by ACT and how their lobbying 
placed considerable pressure on the British Government, which could not explicitly oppose an 
entirely voluntary option for integration without alienating British and international popular 
opinion (personal communication, July 22, 2011). Sure enough, the British Government made clear 
that it was not opposed to integration, even if it was still clearly determined to be a passive actor in 
the process. Meanwhile, the voluntary nature of the Act meant little came of it at the time, even if it 
was a landmark statutory development. The bill had been inspired by the public support several 
Churches had given McIvor’s Shared Schools Plan, but following the Dunleath Act it became clear 
that none of the Churches were willing to match their rhetoric with action. Although they now had 
statutory authority to formally integrate their schools, not a single school chose to integrate 
(Bardon, 2009). As a result, ACT continued to pressure the system by opening Lagan College, 
Northern Ireland’s first integrated school, in 1981. 
 
The story of Lagan College aptly demonstrates the challenges that supporters of integration 
faced under British direct rule as well as their determination to demonstrate that Catholic and 
Protestant children could indeed learn together. Opposition to the school was so great that DENI 
refused it any form of financial aid when ACT approached the Department for assistance. As a 
result, a group of parents was prepared to mortgage their homes for start-up funding before the 
Rowntree Charitable Trust provided last minute support. In large part, Lagan College was a pioneer 
by proving the possibility of opening an integrated school without government aid. Nonetheless, 
the costs were daunting: Lagan College had to raise £750,000 to fund its first four years. During 
this time, ACT continued to pressure the government for assistance, which it ultimately began 
receiving in 1984. However, the reluctance to provide that aid – which only came after four years – 
is damming proof that Westminster had little interest in dispelling the view that opening an 
independent integrated school would be cost-prohibitive (Bardon, 2009).  
 
Even after Lagan opened, the environment remained very difficult for new schools, and the 
Government did little to ameliorate the situation for at least the next several years. The implicit 
lack of support during the late 1980s is best illustrated by the plight of Forge Primary School, 
Northern Ireland’s second integrated school, which opened in 1985. A group of parents, supported 
by ACT, decided to open Forge Primary School when an existing school closed due to falling 
enrolments. As Bardon (2009) recounted, DENI first denied their request to use the Dunleath Act 
to transform the existing school before it closed and then insisted they purchase the property at the 
full asking price (without government assistance) if they wished to open an integrated school. This 
was similar to the situation that Lagan College had faced and was the normal, if still daunting, 
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status quo under British control at least until 1989. ACT took out a short-term interest-free loan 
from the Nuffield Foundation, bought the site, and began leasing it to the newly vested Forge 
Primary School. After self-funding for two years, Forge qualified for integrated status by its third 
year and began to receive full funding for recurrent expenses. At that point, it started the process to 
purchase its school site from ACT using the government’s capital funds. 
 
In a seemingly fortunate stroke of luck, the British Government issued the Education Reform 
(Northern Ireland) Order in 1989, requiring the government to begin providing active support to the 
integrated sector. This implied that there would be greater support for Forge as it applied for 
government funding to purchase its site from ACT. However, Forge’s experience demonstrated 
another instance of the gap between rhetoric and action. The new Education Order shifted 
jurisdiction of integrated schools from DENI’s direct authority to the control of the local Education 
and Library Boards, which oversaw controlled schools on a district level. Although DENI had 
already encumbered approximately $200,000 to purchase Forge’s school site, when the matter 
transferred to the Belfast Library and School Board, that entity decided it was not interested in 
purchasing the site ACT had bought with funds from the Nuffield Foundation, a loan that had to be 
repaid. Neither DENI nor the Government intervened in what subsequently proved to be a long and 
drawn out legal proceeding that disrupted the school, which had to move; strained relations with 
the Nuffield Foundation, which did not receive payment for eight years; and nearly bankrupted 
ACT, which had to pay £46,704 of interest on the original £110,000 loan that would have been 
interest-free if repaid on time (Bardon 2009).  
 
The 1989 Education Reform Order is often referred to as a “watershed moment” in the 
development of integrated education because it introduced statutory support for integrated 
education, began government funding of the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education 
(NICIE3), and allowed new schools to qualify for recurrent funding from day one if they met the 
necessary criteria (Montgomery, 2002). Henceforth, Westminster was significantly more 
supportive of integrated education than it had been during the prior fifteen years. However, 
engaged observers described that support as far more passive than active, and ACT and its allies 
had to remain active in promoting reform. In sociologist Ken Palmer’s words, the British 
government was still prone to “mouthing support for inclusive education, [but] never 
demonstrating any sustained commitment, and more often instead balancing out demands of 
reformers and those in favor of the status quo” (Palmer, 2005, p. 168). Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, 
former ranking British Civil Servant in Northern Ireland, echoed that sentiment in stating his 
biggest regret to be not pushing a more assertive reform agenda while the British government 
reserved authority to do so (personal communication, July 19, 2011). 
 
As an external actor, Westminster was risk-averse and reluctant to support integrated schooling 
if it had the potential to aggravate local politics (which it always did) so it took years of dedicated 
action by ACT before Westminster was willing to take a more supportive approach. It was during 
this period of British direct control that the integrated sector evolved, and the critical role civil 
society played in prompting government action must be recognized. Without the work of ACT (and 
                                                             
3 NICIE was established in 1987 to coordinate efforts between integrated schools in Northern Ireland, support 
new schools, and serve as a clearinghouse for funding. NICIE ultimately absorbed ACT. For more 
information, see Bardon (2009).  
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later NICIE and the IEF4), legislation like the Dunleath Act could have been years coming – or 
never come at all – and the same could be said for the opening of integrated schools. The 
developments during this phase strongly confirm the hypothesis that civil society is necessary to 
the successful implementation of an integration agenda in a deeply divided society. 
 
Questionable Consociationalism 1998-2002 
 
After more than two decades of British direct rule, a settlement was finally reached that began 
the process of devolving power back to Northern Irish institutions. On April 10, 1998, the majority 
of Northern Ireland’s political parties signed the Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement), 
vowing their “total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means” 
(Declaration of Support, 1998, p. 2). Although the peace accord was more inclusive and broader in 
scope than Sunningdale, the political institutions it created bore a number of similarities. Power 
was restored to the Assembly of Northern Ireland, which would be elected by proportional 
representation and appoint ministers using the D’Hondt system (Ibid). While this marked the 
beginning of a move towards greater peace and stability, there were still years of low-intensity 
violence and sectarianism ahead that only furthered the need for an active civil society.   
 
The signatories to the Belfast Agreement also pledged “to facilitate and encourage integrated 
education and mixed housing” in order to create “a culture of tolerance at every level of society" 
(Ibid 23). However, Northern Ireland remains heavily segregated and has actually become more 
segregated over the past twenty years (Knox, 2010). In large part, this is because the consociational 
government shows the same unwillingness to take controversial positions as Westminster. However, 
there is an additional complicating factor. Andeweg (2003) suggested that under a consociational 
system elites were incentivized to strengthen segmentation in order to “reduce their own increased 
intrasegmental vulnerability that is caused by their intersegmental cooperation” (p. 528). In 
laymen’s terms, when a deeply divided society begins to integrate it is not always in the interest of 
the existing elites if they begin losing support to new crosscutting groups. Collectively, these two 
factors – timidity and skewed incentives – have acted as a disincentive for the consociational 
government to instigate education reform and underscored the importance of a dedicated civil 
society committed to counteracting these interests.  
 
Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25, 1998, but continued 
violence meant the peace process remained fragile. The formation of the Executive was continually 
delayed over disagreements about the decommissioning of armed groups, such that a Government 
was not selected until November 29, 1999. That Government would rule under devolution for just 
under three years, until Westminster would be forced to restore direct control in October 2002 
(BBC Timeline, 2006). However, during that time the Northern Ireland Assembly had total control 
over the education system. Most of this power was (and currently is) vested in the Northern Ireland 
Minister of Education, who has wide latitude over education policy once he is selected through the 
D’Hondt system. The Belfast Agreement does build in a consociationalist check on this authority 
by ensuring an opposing party leads the legislative committee tasked with oversight. However, a 
member of this committee was quoted to say: “It is difficult to identify one issue where the 
                                                             
4 The Integrated Ireland Fund (IEF) was founded in 1992 as an independent financial foundation that seeks to 
further integrated education in Northern Ireland. Information about the IEF can be found at 
http://www.ief.org.uk/. 
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Education Committee got the department to change or to make policy” (McKeown & Osborne, 
2006, p. 135). One reason is likely that, from the beginning of devolved power, the relationship 
between Minister and committee has been strained (Ibid).  
 
In 1999, Sinn Fein shocked everyone when they used their fourth pick in the D’Hondt process 
to select the education ministry, and then announced that Martin McGuinness – a former Regional 
Commander of the IRA – would serve as Minister of Education (Palmer, 2005). This led to massive 
protests in Protestant schools, insubordination within DENI, and conflict with the Education 
committee. However, without much formal authority over policy, the committee has often been 
known to resort to political grandstanding that only further increases tensions (N. Richardson, 
personal communication, July 20, 2011).  
 
This type of “ethnic particularism” is indicative of the partisanship that has been present in the 
education sector since power was devolved, and it has had far reaching consequences for education 
reform (Gallagher, 2006). Palmer’s grim assessment is that once power was devolved, “any 
momentum towards integrated education was soon halted” because every issue became a cause for 
sectarian gridlock (Palmer, 2005, p. 195). 
 
As a result, the consociational government shared Westminster’s propensity to be a reluctant 
reformer. One manifestation of this timidity was the emphases on opening transformed schools, a 
process that began under direct control but reached its nadir under devolution. Within the 
integrated sector there are two categories of schools that have not hitherto been differentiated. 
Grant-maintained integrated schools are those like Lagan College that are started from the ground 
up by interested stakeholders. Starting in the mid-1990s, these schools now qualify for recurrent 
operational funding as early as year one and capital grants as early as year three, if approved by 
DENI. Next are controlled-integrated schools. These are traditional controlled schools whose 
Boards of Governors elect to transform them to integrated status, which entails diversifying the 
leadership and enrolment draw to ensure a minimum of 30 percent minority representation.5 These 
schools continue to be funded and managed by DENI.6  
 
Prior to 1996, only three of Northern Ireland’s 28 integrated schools were controlled schools 
that had elected to transform. However, that year, DENI engaged in a review of the integrated 
schooling sector and, as a result of the review, raised the viability criterion for new grant-
maintained integrated schools while simultaneously making it easier for controlled schools to 
transform to controlled-integrated status (DENI, 2010). As a result, there has been a significant 
increase in controlled-integrated schools, which now represent more than one-third of the 
integrated sector (DENI, 2012b). 
 
The transformation policy has been favored under both direct and consociational rule, 
respectively by Westminster and Stormont, because it provides an avenue through which calls for 
reform can be appeased without provoking backlash. Opening grant-maintained schools is 
inherently controversial because these new schools compete with existing controlled and 
                                                             
5 In practice, this means drawing in Catholic students since the controlled schools are majority Protestant.   
6 In theory there is a third category of maintained-integrated schools, which would be comprised of any 
Catholic-maintained schools that elected to diversify their governorship and enrolment draw, while 
remaining under the management of the Catholic Church. However, the Catholic leadership remains opposed 
to this option.  
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maintained schools for students, generating opposition from both the Catholic and Protestant 
communities. By voluntarily transforming an existing controlled school into a controlled-integrated 
school, substantial opposition is mitigated since the number of schools remains constant.  
 
The problem is that transformed schools often transform in an effort to stave off declining 
enrolments, and this has raised questions about their dedication to the mission of integration as well 
as their suitability relative to grant-maintained schools. The Nuffield Foundation found that 
transformed schools rarely meet the same standards as grant-maintained schools. That study 
corroborated the common assessment among stakeholders that transformed schools often lack a 
dedication to the precepts of contact theory, do not have strong buy-in within their community, fail 
to properly train their staff, and often continue to function like a normal controlled school 
(McGonigle, Smith & Gallagher, 2003). Placed within the context of the political system, 
transformation offers a number of benefits attractive to a consociational government unable to take 
controversial stands because of political gridlock and with a vested interest in maintaining some 
level of inter-group segmentation. 
 
This is very much the argument that Ken Palmer (2005) takes when he argues, “the devolved 
power-sharing government established under the Good Friday Agreement lacked any commitment 
[to integrated education] at all” (p. 169). The integrated sector did continue to expand under the 
consociational system but that was very much driven by a civil society that had taken the initiative 
to both open new schools and transform existing ones, while providing them with technical and 
financial assistance. It is difficult to divine what actions the consociational government would have 
taken if an integrated sector had not already existed by 1999. It is unlikely that it would have taken 
major action. Under the current consociational system, Protestants and Catholics continue to be 
largely schooled separately and there has been no effort to change the status quo. Instead, by 
supporting transformation, the consociational government has been as conservative as possible 
without taking an actively opposed position. Despite the government’s impotence, supporters of 
integration have continued to push the standard forward, opening new schools, supporting existing 
ones, and ceaselessly lobbying for further reform.  
 
Conclusion: A Role for Civil Society 
 
In 1973, almost no students were cross-enrolled in schools outside of their denomination, yet 
polling found “sixty-four percent of Catholics and fifty-nine percent of Protestants supporting 
integration” (McGrath, 2000). In 2011, six percent of students were attending integrated schools 
and a poll commissioned by the Integrated Education Fund found 90 percent of the population 
supporting integrated education (Attitudinal Survey on Integrated Education, 2011). At the school 
level there are incredible success stories like Lagan College and the other sixty integrated schools 
now open. Yet, at the macro level, 94 percent of Northern Irish pupils still attend schools exclusive 
to their religious background in a society that continues to be deeply divided.  
 
Where there have been successes, it is important to recognize the critical role played by civil 
society. Beginning with All Children Together (ACT), a dedicated group of parents and local 
citizens of both faith communities rallied around the cause of integrated education. Following the 
failure of the Sunningdale Agreement and its Shared Schools Plan they began actively lobbying 
Westminster to provide an integrated option. That led to a watershed moment when the Dunleath 
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Act was passed in 1978, finally establishing a de jure route for the establishment of integrated 
schooling. Yet, facing continued recalcitrance from both church and state, ACT opened Lagan 
College in 1981. Since then, ACT – and now NICIE and IEF – have supported dozens more 
schools. All throughout, they have placed continual pressure on the Government, be it Westminster 
or the Northern Ireland Assembly. Despite the challenges of the 1990s and the partisanship of the 
2000s, supporters of integrated education have continued to open schools and support them, even if 
the government has been far from supportive. The history of ACT from 1974 onwards strongly 
confirms the hypothesis that civil society is necessary to the successful implementation of an 
integration agenda in deeply divided societies.  
 
It is also important to recognize the validity of the null hypothesis that without a civil society 
committed to reform, an integrated agenda in deeply divided societies will not progress. The best 
efforts of Lord Londonderry in the 1920s and Basil McIvor in 1973 failed to lead to an integrated 
option. In both cases, there was not a group dedicated to supporting their policies and counteracting 
the opposition, or simply acting outside the political system and opening their own schools – as 
ACT did initially with Lagan College and Forge Primary.  
 
Civil society’s successes must be qualified so long as there is a substantial gap between the 
stated support of the general population for integrated schooling and the actual numbers of enrolled 
students. However, without civil society it is unlikely the integrated sector would exist at the scale 
it does today, if it would even exist at all. This has important policy implications for any deeply 
divided society. Regardless of the political system in place, the lesson of Northern Ireland is that 
civil society’s dedication to fostering peace cannot be underestimated.  
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